Working group 3: Discussion paper from the First Plenary Meeting, Gimo,
Sweden, April 3-5, 2002
Main objectives: Measures to improve the accuracy of sanctions and counter
the reactions of targeted actors.
| Scope |
Issues
of concern
Tools available
The clarity of the resolution
Clarity of lists of individuals
Capacity - lack of national capacity
Review, monitoring and assessment of sanctions
Reactions of Targeted Actors and Third States
Sanctions Evasion |
Recommendations
Pre-Assessment
Timing
Capacity
Monitoring
Positive measures/inducements
Communications Policy
Delisting |
Research |
Acrobat
file for printing
 |
How can the accuracy and effectiveness of targeted
sanctions be improved and how can sanctions evasion be addressed?
Scope
The key feature of targeted sanctions is the
limited scope of the sanctions and their focus on specific actors, i.e.
targeted Governments and/or ruling elites, non-state actors, entities
and individuals. Targeted sanctions include financial sanctions, asset
freezes, arms embargoes, aviation sanctions, travel bans, diplomatic sanctions
and restrictions on trade in specific natural resources and commodities
(e.g. diamonds, oil). Key differences from comprehensive sanctions such
as those imposed on Iraq include the overriding issue of minimizing the
impact of sanctions on the civilian population. At the same time, targeted
sanctions require greater attention to monitoring whether or not sanctions
are modifying the behaviour of targets in a desirable direction.
Improving the Accuracy and Effectiveness of Sanctions
- Issues of Concern
Tools available to the Security Council in designing
accurate and effective sanctions
-
Expertise and institutional memory is/should
be available in the Secretariat if Council Members wish to seek advice
about lessons learned from previous targeted sanctions.
-
Importance of existing reports of monitoring
and expert bodies for Council Members to use when drafting new resolutions
on targeted sanctions.
- Assessment reports (humanitarian impact/pre-imposition
reports).
The clarity of the resolution enhances implementation
of sanctions measures
- Clarity of the issues of concern to the Council
(preamble)
- Clarity of the demands on the target government
or other targeted actors (objectives of the sanctions and behaviour
that must change)
- Clarity and definitions of the specific measures
that Member States must implement (the sanctions measures)
Clarity of lists of individuals and entities
subject to targeted sanctions
(when such lists are part of a sanctions regime)
is crucial to accuracy and effectiveness of these measures. Key issues
arising from lists include:
- Justification, transparency and speed of nominating
States regarding selection of individuals and entities for listing.
- Possibility of administrative or judicial processes
(e.g. regular reviews of names on the lists) to address mistakes that
may occur in listing and to take into account compliance by listed individuals
and entities.
- Maximum specificity by Council Members in identifying
individuals and entities to be targeted (e.g. accuracy of names, translations
of names, addresses and affiliations of targets, passport numbers, and
potentially: photos, short descriptions of activities/affiliations making
the individual/entity eligible for inclusion on the list).
- Dissemination of up-to-date lists via the Internet
Capacity - lack of national capacity in some
States to implement sanctions
- CTC
reporting provisions provide valuable information on capacity for implementing
measures in states.
Review, monitoring and assessment of sanctions
once they are in place
- Importance of Sanctions Committee's role in
conducting frequent, regular reviews of the implementation of targeted
sanctions.
- Can Members of the Security Council Sanctions
Committees be encouraged to demonstrate their willingness to review
concerns about inaccurate or problematic targeting (e.g. through public
briefings or the Sanctions Committees)?
- How can resolutions provide maximum flexibility
for Sanctions Committees to follow up with Member States regarding implementation
of targeted sanctions?
Reactions of Targeted Actors and Third States
- Member States may be reluctant to implement
sanctions mandated by resolutions that they believe are overly broad
or that conflict with country-specific legal rights of their citizens/residents,
such as free speech (bans on representation), right to asylum (bans
on residence), or economic and social rights (asset freezes).
- Inducements and positive measures to promote
compliance and cooperation from third states.
Sanctions Evasion
- Careful pre-assessment by Security Council as
well as industry specialists or outside research organizations (where
possible) can suggest likely evasion measures targets will take.
- Sanctions-busting is not always disguised. Where
there are no enforcement mechanisms, violations frequently occur openly.
- Is it possible to include enforcement of a targeted
sanction, such as arms embargoes, in the mandate of UN or regional peacekeepers
when they are present in or near the vicinity of a targeted actor?
- Certification regimes for targeted goods are
generally not standardized (e.g. end-user certificates for arms purchases
or rough diamonds). This creates opportunities for sanctions evasion
using false documents.
- Unintended consequences of targeted sanctions
- may stimulate indigenous production of banned goods (e.g. increased
production of small arms, munitions, etc. in states subject to arms
embargoes, or diamond polishing industry in states subject to sanctions
on rough diamonds).
- Targeted sanctions on specific entities are
flouted by targets that change names of organizations; create front
companies or front organizations.
- Targets evade travel bans by obtaining new passports
through legal and illegal means, or using false names.
- Targets evade financial sanctions (e.g. by sending
money to secure locations or by converting assets to cash and withdrawing
it from financial institutions before sanctions are imposed).

Recommendations
Pre-Assessment
- Urge Security Council to consider capacity of targeted
states to counter sanctions by increasing indigenous production of sanctioned
goods or services (e.g. small arms, light weapons, ammunition, equipment
for internal repression).
- Identify Achilles heel by developing a detailed profile
of target in order to ensure that targeted sanctions selected for implementation
are those with greatest possibility of speedily achieving the objectives
of sanctions.
- Time may not permit detailed pre-assessments in all
cases, but every effort should be made to "front-load" the
assessment and planning process to achieve better outcomes when sanctions
are applied.
- Pre-assessment (or when time constraints do not permit
-- early assessment) of targeted sanctions should also try, where possible,
to anticipate potential country-specific legal issues that Member States
may encounter in implementing sanctions and clarify to the greatest
extent possible the specific measures that Member States have to take
in order to implement UN sanctions and to fully comply with the resolution.
Timing
- Consider pros and cons of short period of delay/probation
prior to implementation of sanctions (e.g. two months for certain sanctions
in Liberia case).
- Consider pros and cons of time-limited sanctions
(e.g. for periods of 3 to 6 months, or one year) with option of renewal.
Clarity in design
- Include definitions of targeted sanctions from previous
sanctions processes (Interlaken, Bonn/Berlin) and related processes
that have credible, agreed, unambiguous definitions for the types of
sanctions under consideration. With respect to financial sanctions,
the Interlaken process and FATF
have produced useful definitions for the terms used in targeted sanctions
(e.g. assets, firms, etc.).
- In cases where the Security Council does not
include definitions in the text of the resolution, Sanctions Committees
should be encouraged to direct Member States that raise questions about
definitions to widely agreed sources for clarification, such as those
contained in the reports of previously completed sanctions processes.
Capacity
- Build on information and understandings resulting
from CTC reporting
process and use it as guidance for improving capacities of Member States
to implement targeted sanctions.
- Utilize regional arrangements or processes to
enhance both implementation capacity and awareness of targeted sanctions
in Member States.
Monitoring
- In all cases, encourage Council Members to include
a monitoring or reporting requirement to the implementing institutions
after imposition of sanctions covering the period just prior to the
imposition of sanctions (i.e. retrospective reporting). This can help
Council Members to track evading tactics that the target may have taken
and to track movements in assets or arms flows. Example: ask banks to
provide the Security Council with the previous six months of records
of the target's financial asset transfers when sanctions are imposed.
- The reporting by Member States should be as
specific as possible, which can be encouraged by having the Committee
pose specific questions to all Member States on a recurring basis.
Positive measures/inducements
- Consider "package approach" including assistance
to Member States to help them implement targeted sanctions that includes
financial and technical assistance for implementation, particularly
for third states that are key implementers of sanctions.
- Public recognition by the Security Council of Member
States that complete their reporting and implementation measures quickly
and fully.
- Exhortative language in the resolution urging donors
to maintain strong levels of aid and assistance to populations in targeted
states.
- Public information campaigns on the rationale
of sanctions (e.g. to end a conflict and save lives) to encourage compliance.
Communications Policy
- Public information campaigns oriented towards civilian
populations in the target state as well as in third states on the rationale
of sanctions (e.g. to end a conflict and save lives). Suitable communication
with the target to encourage compliance.
Delisting
- Consider possible mechanisms to enable individuals
listed as targets to submit information to the Chair of the Sanctions
Committee showing that the listing should not or no longer apply. Is
it possible to create mechanisms at the UN level to address and decide
on such requests? Create appropriate means of information exchange with
Member States.

Research
- Timing sanctions - experience with sunset clauses
in sanctions regime.
- Psychological, financial and other impact of being
on a list for targeted sanctions measures and of being named in a UN
Monitoring Mechanism (or similar) report as a violator of sanctions.
- Role of media and/or the UN in publicizing the objectives
of targeted sanctions and in educating key actors about compliance issues.
- Models and possibilities for standardization of end-user
certificates for targeted goods, in particular arms and military equipment
and related machinery.
- Freezing of financial assets - legal and practical
problems and their solutions.
- Survey Missions to the United Nations and Governments
of Member States not in the Security Council to inquire about their
experiences with implementing sanctions and their recommendations for
improving related procedures.
- Usefulness of Panels of Experts/Monitoring Mechanisms
in assessing the reactions of the targeted actors and third states/spoilers.

Acrobat file for printing
|