Working Group 1: Discussion paper from the Uppsala planning meeting, February 22-23, 2002
Objectives of the Working Group (WG1)
The purpose of WG is to produce recommendations in the form of policy options to strengthen the role of the UN Secretariat and Sanctions Committees (SACOs) in the implementation of targeted sanctions. To this end, the WG will attempt to identify major strengths and weaknesses for both the Secretariat and the SACO that have an impact on their ability to contribute to implementation of target sanctions. This report corresponds to the WG's first meeting in Uppsala, Sweden from 22-23 February 2002.The UN: the Secretariat and the Sanctions Committees
1. The Secretariat
The role of the Sanctions Unit in the Secretariat (the Unit), currently a part of the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs, is to give substantive advice and support to the SACOs. Some of the areas related to implementation of sanctions, as well as some preliminary policy options, were raised during the discussion:
SizeIn principle, sanctions are viewed as temporary/short term procedures. However, in recent times the size of the unit, consisting of about 6-7 professionals and a similar number of support staff, has been insufficient to satisfy the needs and demands of the SACOs. The possibility of developing a virtual capacity on a needs basis could allow the unit to access experts when required based on rosters. Although personnel from INTERPOL has been seconded to the Unit, loan personnel tends to be problematic as it tends to impact on the diversity of staffing.
Information and
analytical capacity
The Unit has very limited capacity to compile or produce analytical information
related to the work of the SACOs. Although the unit does not act as an
investigative branch, it does make use of a wide range of sources including
reports from other UN departments and the media. The information, without
analysis, is then passed to the EPs
who have the investigative/monitoring role.
Budget availability and trust funds
Budgetary constraints are strong, a condition often exacerbated by a lack
of clarity from Security Council mandates and the budgetary implications
to implement them. Trust funds, on the other hand, need to be more flexible,
and donors should take this into consideration.
Monitoring capacity
The Unit does not have a monitoring role since this is done through the
EPs, but especially through member states who bare direct responsibility
on this matter. (Unit-EPs/States relations). Careful thought with regards
to budgeting and institutional structure would be required if a permanent
mechanism for the implementation of targeted sanctions is created based
on a mandate from the Security Council. 
2. The Sanctions Committees
Sanctions Committees have an important role to play in the implementation of targeted sanctions. Any policy options emanating on this subject must take into consideration that each SACO is different in nature. Consequently, it is important that any suggestions made by the working group are not prescriptive but rather follow a best practice approach that can be used as guidance. Some of the relevant areas related to implementation, as well as some preliminary policy options, were raised during the discussion:
The Chair
The individual personality of a chair can have a positive impact in implementation,
but his/her role should be seen and understood within the context of the
wider committee. The experience of Ambassador
Fowler of Canada in the implementation of sanctions against UNITA
in Canada is frequently cited as an example of the role of chair can play
in the implementation of targeted sanctions.
CTC lessons
Can the CTC experience
be of any value to the SACOs? This area needs further exploration for
a number of reasons. First, the CTC has only been recently created, is
chaired by a Permanent Member, and is not in the business of implementing
sanctions but rather devotes most of its time to review reports by member
states. Second, Resolution 1373
has fairly straightforward requirements and does not have an end point.
Sanctions, on the other hand, have varying levels of complexity and various
objectives: travel bans are fairly easy to implement, financial sanctions
are more difficult, while arms embargoes are rarely implemented. Third,
political will and support is absolutely crucial to the success or failure
in implementation of both the CTC and the SACOs. While both are made up
of the representatives of the same states, all committees have varying
levels of commitment that reflects to a large extent, the different levels
of national interest in different sanctions regimes or in combating international
terrorism.
Continuity and institutional memory
There is a need to maintain continuity in the work of the SACOs. Not only
do chairs change frequently, but also newly elected chairs tend to prepare
for there chairmanships after elected in January of their first year in
the Security Council. The issue of institutional memory needs to be build
into the SACOs, and this cannot be left only to the permanent members
but perhaps the Secretariat can also act as a repository of past experience.
A skilled archivist could be appointed to store and manage documents and
other information available to the Secretariat, the committee members
and chairs.
3. Other Issues
Whether a special representative could conduct an assessment of sanctions.
Whether UN agencies in the field should have responsibilities in the compilation of information regarding the implementation of targeted sanctions, and whether this could be counter productive, dangerous, and endanger the neutrality of the UN.UN Relations with other Relevant Actors
The Secretariat and the SACOs are in communication with each other, as well as with a number of relevant actors for the implementation of targeted sanctions, namely, other international organizations, sub-regional organizations, private sector, member states, and targeted units. Their relevance depends, among other factors, on the nature of the sanctions imposed (i.e., travel bans, financial or arms embargoes). Some of the relevant areas related to implementation, as well as some preliminary policy options, were raised during the discussion:
Relations with other international organizations (IOs)
There are common interests and possibilities of cooperation in the transfer
of information between the UN and (i) the Financial Assets Task Force
(FATF-OECD), (ii) the Bank of International Settlement, and (iii) possibly
the Bretton Woods Institutions.
Relations with subregional organizations (SROs)
The UN relations with ECOWAS
and other SROs in the implementation of sanctions are limited. SROs could
provide expertise for the EPs, play a crucial role in the enforcement
of targeted sanctions, and share information with the UN. However, a mechanism
of interaction needs to be established.
Relations with the European Union (EU)
The EU has a role in the implementation of sanctions in the areas of international
trade and finance. Although relations with the UN are frequent and could
provide lessons for UN-SROs relations, there is space for more interaction.
The EU normally interacts with the Security Council and the SACOs via
member states (often the EU state holding the Presidency of the Union),
and through regular briefings in New York and Brussels on EU perspectives
on sanctions.
Relations with the Private Sector
UN relations with the private sector are perhaps more limited UN-SROs
relations, and the only formal process of engagement with the private
sector has been the Kimberley
Process. International trade associations, insurance companies, and
airline associations have a role to play in the Stockholm Process, and
perhaps the Global
Compact project could provide value added to the discussions. The
reports of the EPs on arms brokering is an area where cooperation with
the business community is needed especially with regard to effective end
user certification and air transport.
The issue of coordination
There is a lack of coordination between the Secretariat, SACOs and EPs
in the management of relations with other relevant actors in the implementation
of targeted sanctions. Similar questions are asked, identical contacts
are used, and little information is shared to avoid this duplication.
Instruments available to the UN for Implementation
The UN has a number of instruments that are valuable
for the implementation of targeted sanctions. Some of the relevant areas
identified by the WG, as well as some preliminary policy options, were
raised during the discussion:
Unintended impact of targeted sanctions
Sanctions produce unintended consequences, and occasionally, create political
conditions that hamper the UN's ability to contribute to the implementation
of targeted sanctions. Sophisticated methodologies to assess the humanitarian
impact of sanctions within a target country (as done for Liberia after
Resolution 1345), or the consequences
on third party states in accordance with article
50 of the UN Charter may be desirable as a mechanism of transparency
that may play a role in convincing neighbouring states of the need to
implement sanctions. Unintended consequences, therefore, should be the
object of appropriate consideration and further analysis by this WG.
Media
The Secretary General's spokesperson regularly informs the media of decisions
made by the Security Council but is not expected to promote the implementation
of sanctions. The idea of a Security Council spokesman may be a desirable
idea. The Chairs of the SACOs, on the other hand, act as spokespersons
for the Committee, but their effectiveness could be enhanced if they are
provided with adequate professional support to be able to fulfil this
role properly. During familiarization visits, Chairs have had side coverage
through the press in the areas where sanctions are being imposed.
Communication with states
The media is a medium to promulgate information on sanctions but cannot
substitute communications directly with the member states. Innovative
lessons that promote implementation could be drawn from the CTC experience.
In the end, it is necessary to engage states that also have a responsibility
in the dissemination of objective information regarding sanctions, to
develop tailored communication strategies for each individual sanctions
regime, and to revisit the format of the decisions made by the SACOs (currently
press releases).
The Expert Panels
EPs have played a crucial role in the monitoring and implementation of
sanctions, and are an invaluable instrument available to the SACOs. In
addition to the issue of coordination referred to in this paper, there
may be room for improvement once systematic information identifying the
strengths and weaknesses of the EPs is available. A Franco-British proposal
to create a permanent mechanism for the implementations of targeted sanctions
requires careful consideration because of potential institutional implications
for the UN.
Elaboration of Lists
Some SACOs use lists to identify their targets. Even though the issue
merits consideration, it may be the object of other WGs.
Methodological suggestions
The WG has the following methodological suggestions:
- Invite a member of an EP to become a member of the
WG
It is important to incorporate into the WG a former or current member of an EP that may be in a position to contribute with a perspective on the practical weaknesses and strengthens of this mechanism. His/her experience may provide valuable information with respect to the role of the UN in implementation. - Elaborate specialized research papers
As a result of its discussion, the WG identified a need for the following specialized papers for its consideration: (i) A comparative analysis of the experience of the SACOs including the CTC based on the issues identified in this paper; (ii) UN-Media relations in the implementation of sanctions from a media perspective; (iii) A comparative analysis of the EP based on the issues identified in this paper. - Elaborate short non-papers
As a result of its discussion, the WG identified a need for short (3 to 4 page) non-papers for its consideration: (i) Budget availability and implementation capacity in the UN, and (ii) UN relations with other relevant actors for the implementation of sanctions as described in this paper. - Revisit the Chairman's Proposed
Outcome for the Working Group on Sanctions
It is important to revisit those proposals that may be of relevance to strengthen UN capacity in the implementation of sanctions.